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  • Cobalt, Coltan, and Conflict Minerals: The State of Play in 2026

    In January 2025, the M23 rebel group—backed by Rwanda and approximately 10,000 Rwandan troops, according to UN investigators—seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. More than 3,000 people were killed in less than two weeks of fighting. An estimated 2,400 Congolese soldiers surrendered en masse. Over 150 female inmates were raped and burned to death during a jailbreak in the chaos. M23 then advanced south and captured Nyabibwe, another mining hub, less than a year after seizing Rubaya—a site that harbors one of the world’s largest deposits of coltan and supplies roughly 15 percent of global tantalum production.

    In February 2026, landslides collapsed several artisanal coltan mines at Rubaya, killing at least 227 workers. It was the fourth deadly landslide Global Witness had documented at the site in 18 months. The miners were working in territory controlled by M23. The coltan they extracted was being transported into Rwanda—more than 120 tonnes per month, according to UN experts—where it was laundered and exported as Rwandan product to China, Europe, and the United States. Some of it is in the device you’re reading this on.

    That last sentence isn’t rhetoric. It’s supply chain arithmetic. The DRC produces approximately 70 percent of the world’s cobalt and holds roughly 60 percent of global coltan reserves. These minerals are essential components in the lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles, smartphones, laptops, and advanced weapons systems. The International Energy Agency projects that global cobalt demand will quadruple by 2030. The connection between a mine collapse in North Kivu and a phone in your pocket is not metaphorical. It is three to four intermediaries long, and nearly a billion dollars vanishes from the legal supply chain annually through the middlemen who mix illegally sourced minerals with certified ones.

    What conflict minerals actually are

    The term “conflict minerals” refers to tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold—the “3TGs”—mined in conditions where the proceeds finance armed conflict or the minerals are extracted through forced labor. The designation originates from Section 1502 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which required U.S.-listed companies to disclose whether their products contained minerals sourced from the DRC or adjoining countries. Cobalt was not included in the original definition, though it arguably should have been—the same armed groups, child labor networks, and supply chain opacity that characterize 3TG extraction apply to cobalt with equal or greater force.

    Coltan—short for columbite-tantalite—is processed into tantalum, a heat-resistant metal used in capacitors for mobile phones, computers, medical equipment, and aerospace components. Cobalt is essential for the cathodes in lithium-ion batteries. Together, these two minerals account for a disproportionate share of the DRC’s strategic value and a disproportionate share of its human suffering. Of the estimated 255,000 Congolese mining cobalt, approximately 40,000 are children, some as young as six, working with hand tools for less than $2 per day.

    The 2025 escalation

    The M23 offensive that captured Goma in January 2025 represented the most serious military escalation in the DRC’s eastern provinces in over two decades. The fall of the provincial capital—home to over a million people—triggered a humanitarian crisis that displaced at least 100,000 from camps in the volatile east on top of the millions already displaced by decades of conflict. M23 and allied forces now control North and South Kivu, bordering Rwanda and Burundi, and much of Ituri province with its lucrative gold mines bordering Uganda.

    The mineral dimension of the conflict is not incidental. A UN official told the Security Council that coltan trade from Rubaya’s mines generates an estimated $300,000 per month in revenue for M23. Updated estimates from other UN reporting suggest the figure may be closer to $800,000 per month. “It’s not a coincidence that the zones occupied by the rebels are mining areas,” said Patrick Okenda, a researcher at Global Witness. “It takes money to wage war. Access to mining sites finances the war.”

    Rwanda’s role is particularly complicated. President Paul Kagame has acknowledged that minerals flow through Rwanda from the DRC but frames it as smuggling rather than state-sponsored extraction. A 2024 UN report documented that Uganda falsely labels DRC-sourced minerals as domestic exports. Between 2020 and 2021, Uganda exported $2.25 billion in gold despite minimal domestic production. The U.S. Treasury Department reported in 2022 that over 90 percent of the DRC’s gold was being smuggled to regional states, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, before being refined and exported to international markets through the UAE.

    The Washington Accords

    The Trump administration intervened directly in the conflict under the framework of securing critical mineral access. In June 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted DRC and Rwandan officials to initial a preliminary accord. In December 2025, the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity were signed at a presidential summit, witnessed by the leaders of Angola, Kenya, and Burundi.

    The accords explicitly tied peace negotiations to mineral access for U.S. corporations. The Modern War Institute at West Point published an analysis describing the arrangement as a potential “cobalt quagmire,” warning that Washington risked being drawn into a proxy war in some of Africa’s deadliest terrain. The DRC’s President Tshisekedi had solicited a formal security pact—effectively trading mineral access for American military support—and the analysis noted that “factors that make [the DRC] an attractive node in a critical mineral supply strategy, such as resource abundance and a transactional head of state, also make it a risky place to do business.”

    European private military contractors had already failed in the theater. Several hundred Romanian contractors deployed across eastern DRC from 2022 to 2025. When M23 captured Goma, nearly 300 of them were surrounded and captured, paraded before media, and eventually repatriated through Rwanda.

    The export quota system

    In February 2025, the DRC government suspended cobalt exports for four months to address market oversupply—cobalt prices had been depressed by overproduction and reduced demand from battery chemistry shifts toward lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathodes, which use no cobalt. In October 2025, the government introduced export quotas: companies were allocated specific monthly export volumes, with a 10 percent royalty plus a 5 percent strategic minerals levy. A 9,600-tonne “strategic reserve” was placed under the control of ARECOMS, the DRC’s new mineral regulation authority. Companies that don’t use their full allocations lose them to the government reserve starting January 2026.

    The quota system represents the DRC’s most aggressive move to control its mineral wealth. Industry analysts at CRU Group described it as “a fundamental shift from market-based supply to government-controlled allocation.” The system also mandates electronic tracking of all mineral exports through the Better Sourcing Program, a partnership with RCS Global. Whether the tracking system can actually distinguish legally sourced cobalt from conflict-sourced cobalt in a country where “legal and illegal cobalt quickly mingle,” as the Institute for Security Studies’ Oluwole Ojewale described it, is the question on which the entire framework depends.

    The supply chain problem nobody has solved

    The DRC captures approximately 3 percent of the value in the battery and EV supply chain despite supplying 70 percent of the cobalt. Almost all cobalt mined in the DRC is shipped to China for refining—China processed 77 percent of the world’s cobalt in 2022. The DRC sells raw material. China sells batteries. The value multiplier between the two ends of the chain is roughly 20 to 1.

    The DRC has ambitions to move up the chain. A Bloomberg study identified the DRC as a favorable location for battery precursor production—building a plant there would cost three times less than in the U.S. or China, cut supply-chain emissions by 30 percent, and keep more value in-country. The EU signed strategic partnerships with the DRC and Zambia on critical raw material value chains in 2023. The U.S., DRC, and Zambia signed a memorandum of understanding in 2022 to develop integrated EV battery production. None of these initiatives has yet produced a functioning refinery at scale in the DRC. The infrastructure gap—roads, electricity, skilled labor—remains enormous, and the security situation in the eastern provinces makes investment in processing capacity a proposition that requires either extraordinary risk tolerance or the kind of military guarantee that the Washington Accords are attempting to provide.

    Alternative cobalt sources are in development. Jervois Global’s Idaho Cobalt Operations targets 1,500 tonnes per year with a restart planned for Q2 2026. Fortune Minerals’ NICO Project in Canada has an estimated capacity of 1,728 tonnes per year. Global cobalt production is approximately 130,000 tonnes annually, overwhelmingly from the DRC. The alternative sources represent rounding errors.

    Battery chemistry is shifting. LFP cathodes—which contain no cobalt—are gaining market share, particularly in Chinese EVs and Tesla’s standard-range vehicles. But high-performance applications, particularly long-range EVs and consumer electronics, still require nickel-cobalt-manganese (NCM) or nickel-cobalt-aluminum (NCA) cathodes. Cobalt isn’t going away. The question is whether the supply chain that delivers it can be made less dependent on a country where 227 miners die in a landslide at a site controlled by a rebel militia backed by a neighboring government, and the coltan they extracted still makes it into your phone.

    The honest answer, in 2026, is no. Not yet. Possibly not soon.

    We cover the full geopolitics and chemistry of cobalt, coltan, lithium, and 33 other critical elements across our Rare Earth Elements & Critical Minerals course—including why the supply chain for the green energy transition runs through the deadliest conflict zone on earth.

  • Mycelial Networks in 2026: Can Fungi Actually Think? What Science Says About the Wood Wide Web

    In 2024, a team at Tohoku University in Japan arranged nine wooden blocks on soil in the shape of either a cross or a circle, placed a fungus called Phanerochaete velutina in the center, and watched what happened. The fungus grew outward from the center, consumed the resources in the central blocks, and then—here’s the part that got the headlines—selectively extended toward the outer blocks, distinguishing between inward and outward directions. The researchers described this as a form of spatial pattern recognition. Microbial ecologist Yu Fukasawa said, with the kind of understatement that makes a mycologist sound like a neuroscientist at a cocktail party: “You’d be surprised at just how much fungi are capable of. They have memories, they learn, and they can make decisions.”

    A 2025 study by Yin et al. expanded this further, demonstrating context-dependent food preferences in the slime mold Physarella oblonga—an organism that can evaluate multiple food sources, adjust its preferences based on context, and violate basic principles of rational choice theory in the same ways humans do. A July 2025 paper on Physarum polycephalum showed that slime mold memory isn’t just a reflex—it’s overwritable in light of new information, which ticks the box for a widely accepted criterion of navigational memory.

    Meanwhile, the most popular story about fungal intelligence—the “wood wide web,” the idea that forests are connected by a cooperative underground network of mycorrhizal fungi through which trees share nutrients, send warnings, and nurture their offspring—has been substantially dismantled by the very scientists who helped build it. The state of fungal cognition research in 2026 is that the organisms nobody thought were interesting are turning out to be fascinating, and the narrative everybody loved is turning out to be mostly wrong.

    What the wood wide web actually claimed

    The term “wood wide web” was coined in a 1997 Nature article. The concept, popularized extensively by University of British Columbia forest ecologist Suzanne Simard and German forester Peter Wohlleben’s bestselling The Hidden Life of Trees, goes like this: mycorrhizal fungi form a symbiosis with tree roots, trading soil nutrients for photosynthetic sugars. As fungal filaments spread through forest soil, they physically connect the roots of neighboring trees into “common mycorrhizal networks,” or CMNs. Through these networks, proponents argued, trees transfer carbon and nutrients to each other—sometimes across species—with mature “mother trees” preferentially sending resources and defense signals to their offspring. The forest, in this telling, is less a Darwinian battleground of competing organisms and more a cooperative commune in which trees communicate, share, and care for each other through an underground fungal internet.

    The story was irresistible. It combined genuine science with a narrative that resonated with environmental values, appeared in Avatar and The Last of Us, sold millions of books, and fundamentally changed how a generation of nature enthusiasts understood forests. Simard’s 2021 memoir Finding the Mother Tree became a New York Times bestseller. The wood wide web became one of the most successful science communication stories of the 21st century.

    What the evidence actually shows

    In February 2023, a paper in Nature Ecology & Evolution by Justine Karst, Melanie Jones, and Jason Hoeksema—three mycorrhizal ecologists with decades of combined field experience—examined the evidence behind the wood wide web’s central claims and found them “largely disconnected from evidence.”

    The paper evaluated three claims. First, that common mycorrhizal networks are widespread in forests. The researchers concluded that with current technology, it’s difficult to confirm that continuous, non-transient fungal connections between trees actually persist in the field. Mycorrhizal fungi are extraordinarily delicate—dig up a root to study the connection and you’ve destroyed it. DNA sequencing of fungal networks had been achieved in only five field studies, on a limited range of fungi and tree species. The networks may exist, but their prevalence and permanence have not been established.

    Second, that resources are transferred through these networks in ways that boost seedling growth. The researchers found that in the best-controlled experiments, fewer than 20 percent showed that fungus-connected seedlings performed better than disconnected ones. In the remaining 80 percent, connected seedlings performed the same or worse. Alternative explanations—nutrients moving through soil pores, direct root-to-root transfer—could account for the observed results without invoking the network at all. A critical nuance: even when tagged carbon from one tree showed up in a neighbor, much of it stayed in the mycorrhizal roots themselves rather than being transferred to the recipient tree. The fungi were receiving the carbon. Whether they were passing it along, and whether the amounts mattered ecologically, remained undemonstrated.

    Third, that mature trees preferentially send resources and defense signals to their offspring through CMNs. The researchers stated flatly: “The claim that mature trees preferentially send resources and defence signals to offspring through CMNs has no peer-reviewed, published evidence.” Zero field studies support it.

    The paper also documented a structural problem in the scientific literature itself. The researchers reviewed 1,676 citations of original CMN field studies and found that among papers published in 2022, fewer than half the statements made about the original studies were accurate. A 2009 study that mapped fungal distribution was routinely cited as evidence of nutrient transfer—even though it never investigated nutrient transfer. Alternative hypotheses provided by original authors were consistently omitted in subsequent citations. The wood wide web had become, in the researchers’ words, a scientific game of telephone.

    Karst described the reception of their paper as “a bit of a relief” within the mycology community. Jones, one of the three authors, noted: “I’d like to see more old-growth forests protected but this ‘wood wide web’ distorts the evidence.”

    What fungi actually do (which is strange enough)

    The irony of the wood wide web correction is that the real science of fungal behavior is arguably more interesting than the debunked narrative—it just doesn’t fit as neatly into a story about cooperative forests.

    Mycorrhizal symbiosis is real and ecologically essential. Fungi grow inside and on tree roots, forming relationships that are fundamental to tree nutrition. The fungi access soil nutrients—particularly phosphorus and nitrogen—that roots can’t reach on their own, and in return receive photosynthetic sugars from the tree. This mutualism has existed for over 400 million years and underlies the normal growth of virtually all land plants. It is not in dispute.

    What’s in dispute is whether the relationship is primarily cooperative or primarily transactional—and whether fungi have their own agenda. The framing of the wood wide web cast fungi as benevolent infrastructure, passively shuttling resources between trees for the forest’s collective benefit. The alternative, which the evidence increasingly supports, is that fungi are active agents pursuing their own nutritional interests. When carbon moves from tree to fungus, the fungus may keep most of it. When a fungal network connects two trees, it may be exploiting both of them rather than facilitating communication between them. Some mycorrhizal relationships are parasitic—certain orchids and understory herbs use CMNs not to cooperate but to steal sugars from connected trees. The network isn’t necessarily a commune. It might be a marketplace, or a protection racket, or something with no human analogy at all.

    The cognition research is where things get genuinely weird. Physarum polycephalum—a slime mold that is technically not a fungus but occupies a similar ecological and conceptual niche—can solve mazes, construct transport networks with efficiency comparable to human-engineered systems (it famously replicated the Tokyo subway), make cost-benefit trade-offs, habituate to harmless stimuli, form spatial memories stored in its extracellular slime trails, and override those memories when new information makes them obsolete. It does all of this without a single neuron, using rhythmic contractions of its protoplasm to propagate chemical signals across a network of tubules. A 2024 study showed that actual fungi—not just slime molds—can recognize spatial patterns in their resource environment and adjust their growth strategy accordingly.

    Whether any of this constitutes “thinking” depends entirely on your definition. If thinking requires neurons, fungi don’t think. If thinking means adaptive information processing that integrates sensory input, memory, and decision-making to produce flexible behavior—then fungi do something that, functionally, is difficult to distinguish from thinking, and they do it using mechanisms that predate the evolution of nervous systems by hundreds of millions of years.

    The Underground Atlas

    In 2025, the Society for the Protection of Underground Networks—SPUN—released the first high-resolution predictive biodiversity map of Earth’s mycorrhizal fungal communities, using over 2.8 billion fungal DNA sequences sampled from 130 countries. The map, called the Underground Atlas, represents the most comprehensive picture of below-ground fungal diversity ever assembled. Among its findings: 83 percent of Earth’s climate-critical fungi remain unknown to science, identified only by DNA sequences with no corresponding described species. The underground world, it turns out, is vastly more complex and vastly less understood than even the most enthusiastic mycologist suspected—and the parts we don’t know about may be more important for carbon cycling and ecosystem function than the parts we do.

    The real story of mycelial networks in 2026 isn’t cooperative trees whispering through the soil. It’s a kingdom of organisms that process information without brains, make decisions without neurons, form networks whose structure and function we’re only beginning to map, and play roles in global carbon and nutrient cycling that we can’t yet quantify because we haven’t identified most of the species involved. The wood wide web was a beautiful story. The truth is stranger and, honestly, better.

    We cover fungal cognition, mycelial network research, and the neuroscience of organisms without nervous systems across our Neurozoology course—including why the most interesting question in cognitive science might not be “how does the brain think?” but “what was thinking before brains existed?”

  • Autonomous Weapons and the Kill Chain in 2026: Where AI Meets Lethal Force

    In February 2026, a confrontation between Anthropic and the Pentagon became public. Anthropic’s Claude model had been integrated into the Maven Smart System via Palantir, and when the Department of Defense sought to deploy it in fully autonomous lethal weapons systems without human oversight, Anthropic refused. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth argued that the Pentagon couldn’t be constrained by a vendor’s internal safety policies. Anthropic countered that specific defensive scenarios—like laser interception of incoming drones—could be addressed case by case without abandoning a general prohibition on AI-powered lethal autonomy. The Pentagon rejected that approach as operationally unworkable.

    That exchange crystallized the question that has been building for a decade and is now unavoidable: when combat happens faster than a human can think, who decides whether the machine is allowed to kill?

    The speed problem

    The theoretical debate about human-in-the-loop weapons systems is increasingly being resolved by physics. A drone swarm approaching a military installation at speed, a hypersonic missile in its terminal phase, an adversary FPV drone inside the perimeter of an air base—all present threat timescales measured in seconds. A human being requires roughly 200 to 300 milliseconds to perceive a stimulus and initiate a motor response under ideal conditions. Add situational assessment, rules-of-engagement evaluation, and communication latency, and the realistic human response time for a complex targeting decision is measured in seconds to minutes. The engagement window for many modern threats is shorter than that.

    This is the argument the Pentagon made to Anthropic. Israel’s Iron Beam laser system, whose accelerated deployment began in late 2025, uses autonomous targeting to neutralize incoming threats at speeds no human operator could match. The system identifies, tracks, and engages projectiles in a fraction of the time a human decision-maker would need to process the same information. South Korea has deployed autonomous sentry systems along the DMZ since the mid-2000s—the Samsung SGR-A1, equipped with machine guns and pattern-recognition software, can detect and track intruders and theoretically fire without human authorization, though human approval is currently required. Russia announced serial production of the Marker ground combat robot in March 2025, equipped with Kornet anti-tank missiles and drone swarm coordination capabilities.

    In December 2025, Auterion demonstrated the first multi-manufacturer combat drone swarm—a single operator directing FPV platforms and fixed-wing loitering munitions from different manufacturers as a coordinated force. The demonstration pointed toward a future where one human supervises dozens or hundreds of autonomous lethal platforms simultaneously, which redefines “human in the loop” to something closer to “human vaguely aware of the loop.”

    What DoD Directive 3000.09 actually says

    The U.S. policy framework for autonomous weapons is DoD Directive 3000.09, originally issued in 2012 and updated in January 2023. The directive does not ban autonomous weapons. It establishes a review and approval process for their development and deployment, and it requires that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons systems be “designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”

    The key phrase is “appropriate levels.” The directive doesn’t define a single standard for human control. It creates a spectrum—from fully human-controlled systems to systems with increasing degrees of autonomy—and requires that the level of human involvement be calibrated to the operational context. A defensive system intercepting an incoming missile has different human-oversight requirements than an offensive system selecting and engaging a human target. The 2023 update explicitly acknowledged AI-enabled systems and reinforced that existing international humanitarian law—the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity—applies to autonomous weapons regardless of the degree of automation.

    In practice, this means the United States has positioned itself to develop and deploy autonomous weapons systems across the full spectrum of autonomy while maintaining that human judgment is preserved at “appropriate” points in the kill chain. Critics argue that “appropriate” is doing an enormous amount of work in that sentence, and that the directive’s flexibility is a feature, not a bug—it enables autonomous weapons development without the political cost of explicitly authorizing machines to kill without human approval.

    The FY2026 numbers

    The Pentagon requested a record $14.2 billion for AI and autonomous systems research in its fiscal year 2026 budget. The Replicator program—designed to fast-track deployment of thousands of expendable autonomous drones and surface vessels—received $1 billion in 2025. These are not research abstractions. They are procurement programs producing hardware that is entering or about to enter operational service.

    The fiscal year 2026 NDAA, which authorized $900.6 billion in defense spending, contains provisions addressing autonomous weapons within the broader framework of emerging technology governance. The legislation requires reporting on AI-enabled systems but does not impose new restrictions on autonomous weapons development or deployment beyond those in Directive 3000.09.

    Ukraine has served as the world’s largest testing ground for autonomous weapons concepts. Both sides have deployed increasingly autonomous drones—FPV kamikaze drones with AI-assisted targeting, loitering munitions with pattern recognition, and experimental ground robots. The conflict has demonstrated that low-cost autonomous systems can be decisive in modern warfare, and that the nations watching the conflict—which is all of them—are incorporating those lessons into their own procurement and doctrine at extraordinary speed.

    The treaty that isn’t happening

    The UN Secretary-General called for a legally binding treaty prohibiting lethal autonomous weapons systems from operating without human control, with a 2026 target completion date. The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 79/62 in December 2024 with 166 votes in favor, mandating informal consultations among member states. The Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS, operating under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, has been discussing the issue since 2014.

    The treaty is not happening. Not by 2026, and likely not in any meaningful form while the three largest military AI developers—the United States, Russia, and China—oppose binding restrictions. The U.S. and Russia voted against the November 2025 resolution calling for negotiation of a legally enforceable LAWS agreement. China has expressed support for regulation in principle while continuing to develop autonomous weapons capabilities. Israel, whose national defense increasingly depends on autonomous interception systems, also voted against.

    The Arms Control Association described the current moment as the “pre-proliferation window”—the last opportunity to establish norms before autonomous weapons become as widespread and unmanageable as small arms. The Stop Killer Robots coalition, led by a network of civil society organizations, advocates a two-tiered approach: an outright prohibition on fully autonomous weapons that target humans, combined with regulation of systems with greater human control. The International Committee of the Red Cross has called for legally binding rules by 2026.

    The problem is structural, not rhetorical. The nations with the most advanced autonomous weapons programs are precisely the nations that would need to agree to restrictions for those restrictions to matter, and they have no strategic incentive to constrain capabilities they’ve invested billions in developing. The CCW operates by consensus, meaning any single state can block progress. The Group of Governmental Experts’ mandate extends to 2026, with the CCW Review Conference set as the deadline for a final report, but the likelihood of that report containing binding restrictions that the U.S., Russia, or China would accept approaches zero.

    The accountability gap

    International humanitarian law requires that someone be held responsible for every use of lethal force. The principle of distinction requires distinguishing combatants from civilians. The principle of proportionality requires that civilian harm be proportional to the military advantage gained. The principle of military necessity requires that force serve a legitimate military objective. These principles were designed for a world in which a human being makes the decision to fire.

    When an algorithm makes that decision—or when the decision happens at machine speed with nominal human oversight—the accountability framework fractures. If an autonomous weapon misidentifies a civilian as a combatant and kills them, who is responsible? The manufacturer who designed the targeting algorithm? The commander who authorized deployment? The software engineer who trained the model? The procurement officer who selected the system? The question isn’t hypothetical. In Gaza, reporting has described AI-generated target lists of tens of thousands of individuals, with automated systems recommending strikes at a pace that effectively eliminates meaningful human review of individual targeting decisions.

    The ethical objection—articulated by the UN Secretary-General as “morally repugnant”—is that delegating the decision to take a human life to a machine violates human dignity regardless of how accurately the machine performs. The pragmatic counterargument—articulated by every major military power investing in autonomous weapons—is that the alternative is slower, less accurate human decision-making that results in more casualties, including more civilian casualties, because humans under stress make worse targeting decisions than well-designed algorithms.

    Both arguments are sincere. Both arguments are partially correct. And the tension between them is not going to be resolved by a treaty, because the nations building these weapons have decided that the strategic advantages outweigh the ethical costs, and no international legal framework has ever successfully constrained a weapons technology that major powers considered essential to their security.

    The kill chain is getting shorter. The human role within it is getting thinner. The governance framework is getting further behind. Whether that trajectory is inevitable or merely current policy is the question that 2026’s diplomatic calendar—the CCW Review Conference, the GGE final report, the continuing fallout from the Anthropic-Pentagon confrontation—will begin to answer, even if nobody expects the answer to be satisfying.

    We cover autonomous weapons, drone warfare, electronic warfare, and the full spectrum of emerging military technology across 24 lectures in our Battlefields of the Future course—including why the nations building these weapons and the nations trying to ban them are operating on fundamentally incompatible timelines.

  • Cryptozoology in 2026: What Science Actually Says About Bigfoot, the Loch Ness Monster, and Cryptids

    Jeff Meldrum—the Idaho State University primatologist who spent decades as the most credentialed scientific advocate for the biological reality of Bigfoot—died on September 10, 2025. His book Sasquatch: Legend Meets Science remains the most rigorous attempt to apply formal anatomical analysis to the footprint evidence, and his death removes from the field its most prominent figure who held both mainstream academic credentials and genuine conviction that an undiscovered North American primate exists. Queen’s University Library commemorated his passing by declaring October 2025 “Cryptozoology Month,” which tells you something about how the field occupies a peculiar zone between legitimate inquiry and cultural curiosity.

    Meanwhile, in the Scottish Highlands, the Loch Ness Centre launched the World Federation of Legendary Monsters in 2025—a formal alliance between cryptid research organizations across multiple countries, sharing sonar readings, thermal imaging data, DNA samples, and underwater footage. Their next coordinated search is scheduled for May 22–25, 2026. And Professor Neil Gemmell’s Loch Ness environmental DNA study—the most methodologically rigorous scientific investigation ever conducted at the loch—still has not published its full technical paper, years after the preliminary results were announced.

    This is the state of cryptozoology in 2026: the field’s most serious scientist is dead, its most famous investigation remains incomplete, and its practitioners are simultaneously forming international federations and selling Bigfoot Valentine’s Day shirts. The question of what science actually says about cryptids requires separating the methodology—which is sometimes genuinely interesting—from the conclusions, which are consistently disappointing for anyone hoping monsters are real.

    The eDNA revolution (and what it found)

    Environmental DNA analysis has transformed the scientific investigation of aquatic cryptids from speculation into testable hypothesis. The principle is straightforward: every organism in a body of water sheds DNA—skin cells, feces, mucus, decomposing tissue—and that DNA can be collected from water samples, sequenced, and matched against known species databases. If a large unknown animal lives in a lake, its DNA should be in the water. If it’s not in the water, the animal almost certainly isn’t in the lake.

    Gemmell’s team from the University of Otago collected 250 water samples from various depths and locations throughout Loch Ness in 2019. The preliminary results, widely reported at the time, found no evidence of plesiosaur DNA, no evidence of large fish DNA (ruling out the sturgeon hypothesis), no evidence of any large unknown animal. What the study did find was a significant quantity of European eel DNA—more than expected—which led to the widely circulated but somewhat misleading headline that “Nessie might be a giant eel.”

    The nuance, as zoologist Darren Naish has clarified, is that the study didn’t demonstrate that a giant eel exists. What it demonstrated is that virtually all competing hypotheses for the Loch Ness Monster can be excluded by the eDNA evidence, and the eel hypothesis is the only one that isn’t directly contradicted by the data. That’s a very different claim. The eels in Loch Ness are almost certainly normal-sized European eels doing normal eel things. The study’s actual contribution is negative rather than positive: it tells us what Nessie isn’t, which is everything anyone has ever proposed it might be.

    The eDNA approach has been applied more broadly, and the results follow the same pattern. Water sampling in lakes with reported monster sightings consistently identifies known species—pike, trout, char, eels—and consistently fails to identify anything unknown. Camera traps deployed in forests with frequent Bigfoot reports consistently photograph bears, deer, elk, coyotes, and occasionally hikers—but never an unidentified primate. The tools that modern biology uses to detect rare and elusive species are extraordinarily sensitive. They can identify a species from a single skin cell in a liter of lake water. They can photograph a snow leopard in the Himalayas or a Sumatran rhino in Borneo. They have never, in any controlled scientific deployment, detected a cryptid.

    The Bigfoot evidence problem

    The case for Bigfoot rests on four categories of evidence: eyewitness reports, footprint casts, the 1967 Patterson-Gimlin film, and more recently, eDNA sampling and acoustic analysis.

    Eyewitness reports number in the thousands. The Bigfoot Field Researchers Organization, the largest and oldest Sasquatch investigation organization, maintains a database of sighting reports across North America. The problem with eyewitness evidence—as every forensic scientist and cognitive psychologist will tell you—is that human perception and memory are unreliable, particularly under conditions of surprise, poor visibility, and emotional arousal, which are precisely the conditions that characterize most Bigfoot sightings. The statistical work of Floe Foxon, who applies mathematical analysis to cryptid sighting data, has shown that reported sighting patterns correlate more strongly with human population density and recreational land use than with any plausible distribution of an undiscovered species. You see more Bigfoot where more people go hiking, which is what you’d expect if sightings are driven by misidentification rather than actual encounters.

    Footprint casts are more interesting. Meldrum analyzed thousands of tracks and identified anatomical features—a mid-tarsal break in the foot structure, dermal ridges, consistent proportions—that he argued would be extraordinarily difficult to hoax at scale across disparate locations and decades. The counterargument is that a template-based hoax doesn’t require every individual cast to be independently fabricated, and that the “anatomical consistency” Meldrum identified could reflect the influence of earlier, well-publicized casts on subsequent hoaxers. This argument is inherently unresolvable without a specimen.

    The Patterson-Gimlin film, shot in 1967 in northern California, remains the most analyzed piece of footage in cryptozoology. It shows a large, bipedal, hair-covered figure walking away from the camera. In nearly sixty years, neither conclusive debunking nor conclusive authentication has been achieved. The figure’s gait, muscle movement, and proportions have been argued by various analysts to be either impossible to replicate in a costume or entirely consistent with a person in a suit, depending on which analyst you ask and which assumptions they bring.

    The FBI analyzed hair and tissue samples attributed to Bigfoot across multiple submissions. Every sample was identified as belonging to a known species—deer, bear, elk, cow, synthetic materials, and in one memorable case, human. The results were declassified and published. Not a single sample was unidentifiable.

    What cryptozoology gets right (accidentally)

    The most honest defense of cryptozoological inquiry isn’t that cryptids are real. It’s that the history of zoology is full of animals that were dismissed as legends before they were confirmed as species. The coelacanth—a fish from the age of dinosaurs, thought extinct for 66 million years—was caught off the coast of South Africa in 1938. The mountain gorilla was considered a myth by Western science until 1902. The okapi, the giant squid, the Komodo dragon, the platypus—all were regarded as fantastical before specimens were obtained.

    The difference, and it’s a critical one, is that every one of those species was confirmed through physical evidence—a body, a specimen, bones, DNA from a real animal. The confirmation came from the standard tools of biology applied in the standard way. No species has ever been confirmed through footprint casts, eyewitness reports, or grainy film alone. The tools that discovered the coelacanth are the same tools that have been deployed extensively in Bigfoot and Nessie territory and have found nothing.

    What cryptozoology does contribute to science—unintentionally, and often to the annoyance of its practitioners—is ecological survey data. The Loch Ness eDNA study produced a comprehensive catalog of species diversity in one of Scotland’s most iconic bodies of water. Camera trap deployments in the Pacific Northwest generate wildlife population data. Acoustic monitoring in alleged Bigfoot habitats produces recordings of documented species. The search for monsters, when conducted with scientific methodology, generates useful data about everything except monsters.

    The cultural question that matters more

    The more interesting question than “is Bigfoot real?” is “why does every culture on earth produce stories about large, elusive, humanoid creatures living just beyond the boundary of settled land?” The Sasquatch, the Yeti, the Yowie, the Yeren, the Almas, the Orang Pendek—the pattern is global and ancient. These aren’t independent inventions of the same hoax. They’re independent expressions of something deeply embedded in how human beings relate to wilderness, darkness, and the limits of knowledge.

    The statistical reality is stark. There is no confirmed physical evidence—no body, no bones, no verified DNA, no specimen—for any large unknown primate species in North America, despite the continent being one of the most extensively surveyed landmasses on Earth, with millions of trail cameras, satellite coverage, and a recreational hiking population that puts human eyes on virtually every square kilometer of forest on a regular basis. If a breeding population of eight-foot-tall primates existed in the Pacific Northwest, the absence of a specimen after 60 years of active searching is extraordinarily difficult to explain.

    But the legend persists. The BFRO database continues to receive new reports. The World Federation of Legendary Monsters continues to organize searches. People continue to see things they can’t explain in the woods and on the water, and some percentage of those people will continue to interpret those experiences as encounters with undiscovered species rather than as misidentifications, pareidolia, or the natural human tendency to find patterns in ambiguous stimuli.

    Cryptozoology in 2026 is a field where the tools have never been better and the evidence has never been thinner. The eDNA sampling, the camera traps, the acoustic analysis, the AI-powered pattern recognition—all of these technologies are capable of detecting cryptids if cryptids exist. They have detected everything else. The absence of positive results, after decades of increasingly sophisticated searching, is itself a finding. It’s just not the finding anyone in the field wanted.

    We cover the epistemology of anomalous claims—including cryptids, Fortean phenomena, and the institutions that investigate them—across our Fortean Phenomena course. If the question of why the absence of evidence isn’t treated as evidence of absence by the people doing the searching is more interesting to you than another blurry photograph, the course is built for exactly that tension.

  • Space Elevators in 2026: Engineering Fantasy or Eventual Reality?

    The concept is simple enough to explain on a napkin and difficult enough to build that it’s been 130 years since anyone first described it and we’re still nowhere close. You put a satellite in geostationary orbit—35,786 kilometers above the equator—and you lower a tether all the way down to the surface of the Earth. Anchor it at the bottom. Attach a counterweight above geostationary altitude to keep the whole thing taut. Then you send climbers up the tether, hauling cargo to orbit without a single gram of rocket fuel. The cost per kilogram to geostationary orbit drops from roughly $20,000 on a conventional launch vehicle to an estimated $500. The environmental impact drops to essentially zero. You could, in theory, send 170,000 metric tons to orbit per year on a mature system.

    The Russian scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky described the basic idea in 1895 after visiting the Eiffel Tower. Arthur C. Clarke popularized it in his 1979 novel The Fountains of Paradise. A 2003 NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts study concluded that a space elevator “could be built in the near future with acceptable risk and less funding than some current space programs.” The key word in that sentence turned out to be “could,” because twenty-three years later we still cannot manufacture the tether material, and the tether material is the entire problem.

    One material, and everything depends on it

    A space elevator tether needs to be 100,000 kilometers long, roughly one meter wide, and about as thick as plastic wrap. It needs to support its own weight—which, at that length, is enormous—plus the weight of multiple climbers carrying payloads. The required specific strength (tensile strength divided by density) is approximately 50 to 60 GPa·cm³/g. For reference, the specific strength of steel is about 0.25 GPa·cm³/g. Kevlar is about 2.5. The best carbon fiber composites reach maybe 4. You need a material that is roughly 15 to 25 times stronger per unit weight than the best structural material in common industrial use.

    In 2026, there are exactly three known materials with the theoretical tensile strength to serve as a space elevator tether: carbon nanotubes, single-crystal graphene, and hexagonal boron nitride. Carbon nanotubes have been the poster child for space elevator materials since the 1990s. Their theoretical tensile strength is approximately 150 GPa—more than adequate. The problem is manufacturing them. The longest single carbon nanotube ever publicly reported is 0.5 meters. Nanotube “forests”—bundles grown on a substrate—have reached 14 centimeters at Waseda University, at a growth rate of one meter every 186 hours. The tether requires 100,000 kilometers of continuous, defect-free material. The gap between 0.5 meters and 100,000 kilometers is not a gap that incremental manufacturing improvements are going to close on any human timescale.

    This is why the International Space Elevator Consortium—yes, there is one, and they publish monthly newsletters on tether materials research—has increasingly shifted its focus to graphene. Graphene was isolated for the first time in 2004 and won the Nobel Prize in 2010. Its theoretical tensile strength is approximately 130 GPa, comparable to carbon nanotubes. But here’s the critical difference: polycrystalline graphene can already be manufactured at lengths of one kilometer and speeds of two meters per minute. Multiple industrial companies are producing it commercially. The material isn’t at tether quality yet—you need single-crystal graphene with no grain boundaries or defects, manufactured as a continuous sheet at industrial scale—but the trajectory from “lab curiosity” to “industrial product” is incomparably more advanced than the trajectory for nanotubes.

    ISEC’s current leading candidate is what they call “graphene super laminate”—multiple layers of single-crystal graphene bonded together through a process they describe as “spot welding” using covalent carbon-carbon bonds. In theory, this creates a material where each layer retains graphene’s extraordinary in-plane strength while the interlayer bonds prevent the shearing weakness that plagues regular multilayer graphene. In September 2025, ISEC reported that spot-welding layers of graphene had been demonstrated in the lab and produced a material with diamond-like properties. In February 2026, they published research on atomic oxygen corrosion resistance of graphene super laminate—addressing one of the critical environmental hazards a tether would face in low Earth orbit.

    Whether graphene super laminate can actually be manufactured at 100,000-kilometer continuous lengths, at tether-quality purity, at a speed that doesn’t require decades of production time, and at a cost that makes the project economically viable rather than merely physically possible—that remains entirely undemonstrated. The gap has narrowed. The gap is still enormous.

    Everything else that’s also impossible

    The tether material gets all the attention because it’s the most obvious bottleneck, but it’s worth cataloging the other engineering challenges that would need to be solved even if someone handed you a perfect tether tomorrow.

    The climber system needs to ascend 35,786 kilometers to geostationary orbit. At reasonable speeds, that’s a multi-day journey—Obayashi Corporation’s 2012 design estimated eight days. The climber needs to be powered the entire way, and it can’t carry all its fuel because that would make it too heavy. Proposed solutions include ground-based lasers beaming power to photovoltaic cells on the climber, which introduces its own set of engineering problems including atmospheric attenuation, beam tracking accuracy across thousands of kilometers, and what happens to anything that accidentally flies through the beam path.

    Space debris. The tether passes through low Earth orbit, where thousands of tracked objects and millions of untracked fragments are traveling at orbital velocity—roughly 7.8 kilometers per second. A collision between a piece of debris the size of a marble and a tether the thickness of plastic wrap would be catastrophic. ISEC published a June 2025 analysis titled “The Space Elevator Tether and Space Debris: Irresistible Force Meets Impenetrable Object?” The paper-thin ribbon design proposed by researcher Bradley Edwards would help—a ribbon can survive small punctures because the stress redistributes across its width—but routine avoidance maneuvers for tracked debris would still be necessary, and the tether can’t exactly dodge.

    Atmospheric hazards. The bottom portion of the tether passes through the troposphere, where it encounters wind loads, lightning strikes, and weather of every variety. The portion passing through low Earth orbit encounters atomic oxygen, which corrodes most materials. The Van Allen radiation belts degrade molecular bonds over time—though studies suggest carbon nanotubes could survive radiation for over 1,000 years. Gravitational perturbations from the Moon and Sun create oscillations in the tether that need damping systems.

    The anchor station. The tether needs to be anchored at the equator, ideally on an ocean platform to allow positional adjustments and avoid geopolitical complications. Building and maintaining a floating platform capable of anchoring a structure under millions of newtons of tension, in equatorial waters, indefinitely, is itself a major engineering project.

    Where the money actually is in 2026

    A market research report published in March 2026 values the “space elevator market” at $720 million, projected to reach $1.16 billion by 2030. These numbers require some decoding, because there is no space elevator to buy or sell. What the market consists of is materials research (primarily carbon nanotubes, graphene, and boron nitride), climber system design, tether dynamics modeling, and related R&D. The major corporate names are Obayashi Corporation (which still maintains its 2050 target date for a completed space elevator), Shimizu Corporation, Tethers Unlimited, and the LiftPort Group—whose CEO admitted in 2019 that “little progress had been made” on their original space elevator ambitions despite years of effort.

    Google X investigated the concept around 2014 as part of its Rapid Evaluation R&D team. They concluded that nobody had manufactured a perfectly formed carbon nanotube strand longer than a meter and put the project in “deep freeze,” where it has remained. They reportedly keep tabs on materials science advances, which is Silicon Valley’s polite way of saying “we’ll wait.”

    The honest assessment

    The International Academy of Astronautics published feasibility assessments in 2013 and 2019, both concluding that Earth-based space elevators are feasible in principle and that the critical bottleneck is the tether material, which they projected could achieve the necessary specific strength “within 20 years.” That projection, made in 2013, would put the material breakthrough at approximately 2033. The graphene super laminate research is consistent with that timeline in the sense that the trajectory is visible, even if the destination hasn’t been reached.

    Obayashi’s 2050 target—an operational space elevator with an eight-day trip to geostationary orbit—is the most specific commitment from a credible engineering firm. Whether it’s achievable depends almost entirely on whether single-crystal graphene or an equivalent material can be manufactured at scale within the next decade, which is a materials science question that nobody can answer with confidence.

    The comparison that clarifies the situation: in 1903, the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk. In 1969, Apollo 11 landed on the Moon. Sixty-six years from first powered flight to lunar landing. The space elevator concept has existed for 130 years. The materials science necessary to build it has been actively researched for roughly 30. The longest carbon nanotube is half a meter. The required tether is 100,000 kilometers. The concept is not fantasy—the physics is sound, the engineering challenges are understood, and the materials are making measurable progress. But “eventual reality” is doing a lot of work in that phrase, and “eventual” might mean 2050, or 2080, or later, depending on breakthroughs that cannot be scheduled.

    We cover space elevators alongside 23 other civilization-scale engineering challenges—from fusion reactors to ocean thermal energy to asteroid mining—across our Moonshot 2169 course. If the gap between “the physics works” and “we can actually build it” is where your brain lives, the course is 24 lectures of exactly that tension.