In April 2025, China imposed export licensing requirements on seven rare earth elements—samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium—plus all their derivative compounds, metals, and magnets. Export volumes dropped roughly 74 percent within a month. Carmakers in the United States and Europe couldn’t get permanent magnets. Some cut production. Some shut down factories temporarily. European rare earth prices hit six times the Chinese domestic price—a spread so wide it essentially constituted an export tax without calling itself one. The International Energy Agency described it as supply concentration risk “becoming reality.”
Then in October, China escalated. Five more elements added to the control list. Export restrictions extended to lithium-ion battery supply chains, synthetic graphite anode materials, and superhard materials including synthetic diamond. And—this is the part that made trade lawyers lose sleep—China applied the foreign direct product rule to rare earths for the first time. That mechanism, which the U.S. had pioneered to restrict semiconductor exports to China, now worked in reverse: products made anywhere in the world using Chinese-origin rare earth materials or Chinese rare earth processing technology required an export license from Beijing. China wasn’t just controlling what left its borders. It was claiming jurisdiction over what happened to its materials after they left.
The controls were partially suspended in November 2025 as part of a broader U.S.-China trade negotiation, buying roughly a year of breathing room. But the message was delivered. China had demonstrated that it could, at will, disrupt the supply chains for electric vehicles, wind turbines, fighter jets, guided missiles, smartphones, MRI machines, and essentially every piece of advanced technology that relies on permanent magnets—which is most of them. And it demonstrated this not through a theoretical exercise or a diplomatic warning but by actually doing it, watching the global manufacturing base scramble, and then offering to turn it back on as a negotiating concession.
The question everyone should be asking is not “how did China get this leverage?” The question is “how did every other country let them?”
The strategic bet nobody noticed
The standard version of this story starts with Deng Xiaoping reportedly saying in 1992 that “the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.” Whether he actually said it in those exact words is debated—the original context was a visit to Bayan Obo, the world’s largest rare earth mine, in Inner Mongolia—but the policy direction was unmistakable. China decided, decades before anyone else was paying attention, that rare earth processing would be a strategic industry worth dominating.
The decision wasn’t about mining. Rare earth elements are not geologically rare—they’re found on every continent, including in the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and throughout Africa and Scandinavia. The name is misleading. What’s rare is the willingness to process them, because rare earth processing is genuinely nasty. Separating individual rare earth elements from ore requires extensive chemical processing—solvent extraction, acid leaching, ion exchange—that produces large volumes of toxic and sometimes radioactive waste. The environmental costs are enormous. The margins, historically, have been thin. And the capital investment required to build a separation facility from scratch is measured in billions of dollars and years of construction.
China accepted those costs. Starting in the 1980s and accelerating through the 1990s and 2000s, Chinese state-supported enterprises built out the entire value chain: mining, concentration, separation, oxide production, metal refining, alloy manufacturing, and finished magnet production. They did it with lower labor costs, lower environmental standards, and state subsidies that made it effectively impossible for competitors to operate profitably. Western rare earth operations—including the Mountain Pass mine in California, which had been the world’s largest rare earth producer—shut down because they couldn’t compete on price. By the early 2010s, China controlled over 95 percent of global rare earth production.
The genius of the strategy—if that’s the right word for a policy that also created massive environmental sacrifice zones across Inner Mongolia—was that China didn’t just dominate one link in the chain. It dominated every link. Mining the ore is step one. Separating it into individual oxides is step two. Reducing the oxides to metals is step three. Alloying the metals and manufacturing finished magnets is step four. Each step requires specialized expertise, equipment, and chemical processes that take years to develop. China built all four steps while the rest of the world was content to buy the output. By the time anyone realized the dependency was strategic rather than merely commercial, the dependency was so deep that unwinding it would take a decade at minimum.
The numbers in 2026
The IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook reports that for 19 of 20 important strategic minerals, China is the leading refiner, with an average market share of 70 percent. For rare earths specifically, the concentration is even more extreme. China processes approximately 90 percent of the world’s rare earth oxides. It manufactures roughly 85 percent of global NdFeB permanent magnets. It controls a near-monopoly—95 percent or above—in precursor cathode materials and lithium iron phosphate cathode materials for batteries.
The European Central Bank estimated that over 80 percent of large European firms are no more than three intermediaries away from a Chinese rare earth producer. That’s not a supply chain. That’s a dependency relationship with a single counterparty who has demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to restrict supply for geopolitical purposes.
The U.S. position is marginally better but not fundamentally different. MP Materials operates the Mountain Pass mine in California—the only active rare earth mining operation of scale in the country—and in 2024 produced a record 45,000 metric tons of rare earth oxide concentrate. Its Independence facility in Fort Worth, Texas, began trial production of sintered NdFeB magnets in late 2025, with a target capacity of about 1,000 metric tons per year. Global NdFeB magnet production is roughly 220,000 to 240,000 metric tons annually. MP Materials’ output, at full capacity, would represent less than half a percent of global supply. The Pentagon awarded a conditional $620 million loan to Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies to scale domestic magnet production. Noveon Magnetics is currently the only active rare earth magnet manufacturer in the United States and announced a partnership with Australian producer Lynas Rare Earths to build a domestic supply chain. All of these efforts are real and necessary and collectively amount to a rounding error relative to China’s installed capacity.
Why you can’t just “build more mines”
The most common response to the rare earth supply chain problem—from politicians, editorial writers, and people who haven’t spent time understanding the chemistry—is some version of “we have rare earths too, we should just mine them.” The problem is that mining is the easy part. It’s the processing that creates the monopoly, and processing is where China’s advantage is nearly insurmountable in the short term.
Separating rare earth elements from each other is one of the most chemically demanding industrial processes in existence. The 17 rare earth elements have nearly identical chemical properties—that’s why they’re grouped together—which means separating, say, neodymium from praseodymium from dysprosium from terbium requires hundreds of stages of solvent extraction, each stage achieving only a marginal enrichment. The process consumes enormous volumes of hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide, and organic solvents, and produces proportional volumes of chemical waste. Building a separation plant from scratch takes three to five years and costs over a billion dollars. Qualifying the output to meet the specifications required by magnet manufacturers—purity levels of 99.5 percent or higher for individual oxides—adds additional time and expertise.
China has spent forty years optimizing these processes. The rest of the world is starting from approximately zero, and the engineers and chemists who know how to run a rare earth separation plant at commercial scale are overwhelmingly in China. You can build the facility. Staffing it with people who know what they’re doing is a different problem.
The 2010 precedent nobody learned from
This isn’t even the first time China used rare earth export controls as geopolitical leverage. In 2010, following a territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China informally restricted rare earth exports to Japan—the world’s largest rare earth consumer at the time and a major manufacturer of permanent magnets and electronics. The embargo was never officially acknowledged but was widely reported by Japanese importers and confirmed by market data showing a sudden, dramatic drop in shipments.
The global response was alarm, hand-wringing, and a burst of investment in alternative supply chains that faded as soon as prices normalized. The U.S. opened the Mountain Pass mine back up. Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths built a processing facility in Malaysia. The WTO ruled against China’s export quotas in 2014. China lifted the quotas. Prices came down. And the structural dependency went essentially unchanged because the alternative projects were more expensive than Chinese supply and couldn’t compete once the price pressure was removed.
Fifteen years later, the same vulnerability was exploited with the same playbook, except this time the controls were more comprehensive, the extraterritorial provisions were new, and the geopolitical context—a genuine strategic competition between the U.S. and China rather than a bilateral territorial dispute—suggests the restrictions will recur regardless of any temporary suspension.
What the response actually looks like
The EU passed the Critical Raw Materials Act and launched the RESourceEU initiative for joint purchasing and stockpiling. The European Parliament called China’s actions “coercive” and demanded acceleration of domestic mining projects and bilateral partnerships with alternative supplier nations. Germany committed to €35 billion in resilience and deterrence programs that include rare earth supply chain diversification.
The U.S. is pursuing a multi-track strategy: domestic mining and processing (MP Materials, Vulcan Elements), allied supply chains (Lynas partnership with Noveon), tariffs on Chinese magnets (25 percent, scheduled for 2026), and stockpiling. The Pentagon’s Defense Logistics Agency maintains a strategic reserve of certain rare earth materials, though the size and adequacy of the reserve are classified.
But here’s the honest assessment: none of these efforts will meaningfully reduce China’s leverage within the next five years. The processing infrastructure takes years to build, the workforce takes years to train, the qualification cycles for defense-grade materials take years to complete, and the volumes required to replace Chinese supply are orders of magnitude beyond what any current Western facility can produce. The 2025 export controls demonstrated that China can inflict significant economic damage on the global manufacturing base essentially at will—and that the threat of doing so is itself a powerful bargaining chip that costs Beijing nothing to maintain.
The rare earth monopoly is not a market failure. It’s a strategic outcome, achieved through decades of deliberate industrial policy, tolerated by decades of Western indifference, and now leveraged with a precision that makes it one of the most effective instruments of economic statecraft in the 21st century. The question of how to respond is real and urgent. The question of whether a response is possible in time to matter during the current geopolitical cycle is considerably less certain.
We cover China’s rare earth strategy—along with the science, processing chemistry, and geopolitics of 36 critical elements from lithium to uranium—across our Rare Earth Elements & Critical Minerals course. If the foreign direct product rule applied to magnets changed your understanding of how supply chain warfare works, the course goes element by element through every chokepoint.
