Tag: MP Materials

  • Terbium: The Bottleneck Inside the Bottleneck

    On April 4, 2025, China imposed export controls on seven heavy rare earth elements — samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium — along with their compounds, metals, alloys, and any magnets containing them. On October 9, 2025, Beijing expanded the controls to include holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and — critically — “parts, components, and assemblies” containing any of these materials, including products manufactured outside China using Chinese-sourced inputs at concentrations as low as 0.1%. The controls were suspended on November 7, 2025, as part of the Xi-Trump trade agreement, for one year until November 2026. They are, as of this writing, frozen — not withdrawn. Before the suspension, European dysprosium oxide prices reached $900 per kilogram, roughly triple the Chinese domestic price of $255. Terbium oxide was trading at levels that caused suppliers to halt sales to private investors entirely, prioritizing industrial customers. The CEO of Germany’s Vacuumschmelze — one of the few rare earth magnet manufacturers outside China — told Reuters in November 2025: “If you talk about critical resources, it’s really the heavies, the heavies, the heavies — all the rest we will get.” He was talking about terbium and dysprosium. And he was right.

    What terbium does

    Terbium is a heavy rare earth element — atomic number 65 — and its industrial importance is almost entirely about magnets. Neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets are the most powerful permanent magnets in existence, used in every EV traction motor, every direct-drive wind turbine generator, every hard disk drive, every guided missile, every MRI machine, and most industrial robots. The problem with NdFeB magnets is that they lose their magnetic properties at elevated temperatures — above roughly 80°C, an NdFeB magnet begins to demagnetize. An EV motor operating under sustained load, a wind turbine nacelle in summer heat, a fighter jet engine bay — all exceed that threshold. Adding small quantities of terbium or dysprosium to the alloy extends the operating temperature range to 200°C or higher. The addition is small — a few percent by weight — but the effect is the difference between a magnet that works in a laboratory and a magnet that works in a car.

    Terbium is the more effective of the two heavy rare earth additives — it provides stronger coercivity enhancement per unit of concentration than dysprosium — but it’s also rarer and more expensive. In practice, magnet manufacturers use both, often in combination, depending on the application’s thermal requirements and the relative cost and availability of each. For the highest-performance applications — military systems, aerospace actuators, precision guidance systems — terbium is preferred. For lower-temperature applications, dysprosium suffices.

    Beyond magnets, terbium has a secondary role in phosphors — it emits a vivid green light when excited, which made it essential for color television, fluorescent lighting, and trichromatic display systems. LED technology has largely displaced fluorescent phosphors, but terbium-based phosphors remain relevant in medical imaging, scientific instruments, and specialized displays. Terbium is also the primary component of Terfenol-D — an alloy of terbium, dysprosium, and iron that exhibits the strongest magnetostriction of any known material, meaning it physically expands and contracts in response to magnetic fields. Terfenol-D is used in naval sonar transducers, precision actuators, and vibration sensors. A submarine’s ability to detect other vessels depends, in part, on terbium.

    Where 98% comes from

    China controls over 90% of refined terbium supply. The highest-grade commercial deposits are ion-adsorption clays in southern China — Jiangxi, Guangdong, Fujian — where heavy rare earths are adsorbed onto clay particles and extracted by leaching with ammonium sulfate. A ton of clay yields a few hundred grams of mixed rare earth oxides, of which terbium might constitute a few grams. The extraction is low-tech, environmentally destructive (the leaching process contaminates groundwater and strips hillsides), and labor-intensive — but the deposits are uniquely rich in the heavy rare earths the magnet industry needs.

    Myanmar has become the second most important source of heavy rare earth ore — mined primarily in the Kachin and Wa states by ethnic militias operating in a civil war zone, shipped across the Chinese border, and processed in Chinese separation facilities. The ore flows through a corridor that China effectively controls on both ends: the armed groups who mine it depend on Chinese buyers, and the separation capacity that converts raw ore into usable oxide is 98-99% concentrated in China. Conflict minerals is a term usually applied to the DRC’s cobalt and coltan supply chains. The Myanmar heavy rare earth trade has the same structural characteristics — extraction in a conflict zone, processing controlled by an external power, and end-use in consumer products whose buyers rarely ask where the material came from.

    The West has deposits but not capacity. MP Materials’ Mountain Pass mine in California produces light rare earths — neodymium and praseodymium — but contains only traces of terbium and dysprosium. Lynas Rare Earths in Australia began heavy rare earth separation in Malaysia in 2025, becoming the first non-Chinese heavy rare earth separator on Earth — but at initial volumes of roughly 250 tonnes of dysprosium and 50 tonnes of terbium per year, it’s a fraction of global demand. Energy Fuels, a Denver-based uranium miner, is pivoting to rare earth separation using similar process chemistry — but is not yet producing at scale. Brazil is emerging as an ore exporter, but as Benchmark Mineral Intelligence noted, “the technology for HREE refining is expected to be available globally by 2029” and “costs outside of China remain 5-7 times higher.” The problem is not that heavy rare earth deposits don’t exist outside China. The problem is that the separation and refining capacity to convert those deposits into usable materials is, as of 2026, a Chinese monopoly with a few early-stage Western competitors years away from meaningful scale.

    The April 2025 export controls

    The April 2025 controls followed the same escalation pattern the Rare Earth Elements course has documented across gallium/germanium (July 2023), graphite (October 2023), antimony (August 2024), and tungsten (early 2025) — but with a crucial escalation. The earlier controls restricted raw materials and processed forms. The April 2025 controls restricted magnets containing terbium and dysprosium — finished products, not just feedstock. The October 2025 expansion went further: it applied extraterritorial jurisdiction to “parts, components, and assemblies” containing Chinese-sourced rare earth materials, even if manufactured outside China, even if traded domestically in a third country. A European carmaker using a motor containing a magnet with 0.1% Chinese-origin terbium would, under the October rules, need a Chinese export license for the motor — not for the terbium, for the motor.

    The IEA reported that after the April controls took effect, “many carmakers in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere struggled to obtain permanent magnets, with some forced to cut utilisation rates or even temporarily shut down factories.” European rare earth prices reached up to six times Chinese domestic prices. The November 2025 suspension froze the escalation but did not reverse it. The controls remain on the books. The licenses remain at Beijing’s discretion. The semiconductor supply chain has TSMC in Taiwan. The lithium supply chain has Chinese refining. The magnet rare earth supply chain has something worse: Chinese separation capacity so dominant that the export controls don’t just restrict supply — they assert jurisdiction over finished products manufactured anywhere in the world using Chinese-origin inputs. That’s not a trade restriction. That’s extraterritorial industrial policy.

    Why terbium is the real bottleneck

    McKinsey projects global demand for magnet rare earths will triple from 59,000 tonnes in 2022 to roughly 176,000 tonnes by 2035. Under rapid clean-energy adoption scenarios, terbium requirements could reach 134-256% of available supply — meaning the energy transition needs one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half times more terbium than the planet currently produces. The EU projects that demand for rare earth magnets could increase tenfold by 2050. The projected 60,000-tonne shortfall by 2035 — approximately 30% of total requirements — is concentrated in the heavy rare earths, not the lights. Neodymium and praseodymium can be sourced from Mountain Pass, from Lynas, from emerging projects in Brazil and Africa. Terbium and dysprosium cannot — not at the volumes the market needs, not at processing costs the market can absorb, and not from facilities that currently exist outside Chinese control.

    Every EV motor, every wind turbine, every humanoid robot actuator, every military guidance system that requires a high-temperature permanent magnet runs into the same constraint: the heavy rare earths that make the magnet work at temperature come from one country, are separated in one country, and are now subject to export controls that assert jurisdiction over products made in every other country. The nickel supply chain was restructured by Indonesian resource nationalism in five years. The terbium supply chain was never diversified enough to restructure — it started concentrated and stayed concentrated, and the concentration is now being weaponized.

    This is the kind of supply chain our Rare Earth Elements course was built to map — where the element that allows an EV motor magnet to survive operating temperature is separated from clay in southern China and a civil war zone in Myanmar, refined in facilities that are 98% Chinese-controlled, subject to export controls with extraterritorial reach, and projected to be in deficit by 2035 under every growth scenario the energy transition requires.

  • Critical Minerals and the CHIPS Act: How the US Is Trying to Build a Domestic Supply Chain

    The CHIPS and Science Act was signed into law in August 2022 to rebuild American semiconductor manufacturing. By 2025, the Trump administration had redirected at least $2 billion of its funding toward something the original legislation barely mentioned: critical minerals. The pivot tells you everything you need to know about where the actual bottleneck sits. You can build a semiconductor fab in Arizona — and the U.S. is building several — but if the neodymium magnets in the fab’s equipment, the gallium in the compound semiconductors, the germanium in the fiber optics, the cobalt in the tooling alloys, and the rare earth elements in the electric motors all come from China, then you’ve built a factory that runs on your adversary’s supply chain. The CHIPS Act started as a semiconductor bill. It’s becoming a critical minerals bill because the people implementing it realized the two problems are the same problem.

    The scale of the dependency

    China controls approximately 90 percent of global rare earth processing, 80 percent of gallium production, 98 percent of gallium metal output, 60 percent of germanium, and dominant shares of graphite, manganese, and cobalt refining. The United States has exactly one operational rare earth mine — MP Materials’ Mountain Pass facility in California — and until recently had zero domestic capacity to separate rare earth oxides into individual elements, zero capacity to produce rare earth metals from those oxides, and zero capacity to manufacture the neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets that go into everything from F-35 fighter jets to MRI machines to wind turbine generators to EV motors. The U.S. mined the ore and shipped it to China for processing. That’s like growing wheat and sending it abroad to be turned into bread.

    When China imposed export controls on gallium and germanium in July 2023, exports dropped 97 percent in three months. European prices doubled. The demonstration was unambiguous: China could turn the valve on materials that the defense industrial base requires and the U.S. has no domestic alternative for. The semiconductor supply chain runs through a handful of chokepoints. The critical minerals supply chain runs through fewer. And unlike chips, where TSMC’s advantage is technological, China’s advantage in minerals processing is infrastructural — built over three decades of sustained investment that the U.S. chose not to match.

    What the government is actually doing

    The response since 2025 has been the most aggressive federal intervention in mining and materials processing since the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was established. The Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Capital deployed over $4.5 billion in capital commitments by January 2026, closing six major critical mineral deals in a single year. The scale and structure of individual deals illustrate how far the government is willing to go.

    MP Materials — the Mountain Pass operator and sole U.S. rare earth miner — received a $400 million equity investment from the Pentagon plus a $150 million loan to build heavy rare earth separation capacity in California. The Pentagon also established a price floor of $110 per kilogram for neodymium-praseodymium oxide — effectively guaranteeing MP Materials a minimum revenue regardless of market fluctuations. That’s the government acting as both investor and customer, de-risking a market that private capital alone won’t enter because Chinese producers can dump prices below any Western competitor’s cost of production.

    Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies secured a $1.4 billion public-private partnership — $620 million in Pentagon loans, $50 million from the Department of Commerce under the CHIPS Act (with the government receiving an equivalent equity stake), and $550 million in private capital — to manufacture up to 10,000 metric tons of NdFeB magnet material domestically. USA Rare Earth announced a $1.6 billion debt and equity package with the government taking a 10 percent ownership stake. In Alaska, the Pentagon invested $35.6 million for a 10 percent stake in Trilogy Metals’ Upper Kobuk project. In Louisiana, Ucore Rare Metals received $18.4 million from the Army for a commercial-scale rare earth separation facility.

    The National Defense Stockpile, a strategic reserve created in 1939 and largely neglected for decades, received $2 billion in new funding through the One Big Beautiful Act. The Pentagon announced intent to procure up to $1 billion in stockpile materials, issuing requests for information on scandium, tungsten, graphite, samarium, dysprosium, and terbium — minerals for which the U.S. has known deposits but essentially zero commercial production capacity.

    The permitting acceleration is the other half. A March 2025 executive order expanded Defense Production Act authorities, reduced approval requirements, and directed streamlined permitting for mineral projects. The Department of the Interior published a new Critical Minerals List in November 2025, expanded from 50 to include additional materials based on updated methodology. In January 2026, Section 232 tariff actions targeted processed critical minerals alongside semiconductors — not yet imposing duties on minerals, but establishing monitoring frameworks and requiring Commerce to report on whether future restrictions are warranted.

    Why it might not work fast enough

    The money is real. The policy intent is clear. The problem is time. The average timeline from mineral discovery to production in the United States is 17 to 29 years. Environmental review, permitting, judicial challenge, construction, commissioning, and ramp-up each take years. China didn’t build its mineral processing dominance through a single piece of legislation. It built it through three decades of sustained investment, deliberately subsidized production, environmental shortcuts that no Western democracy would permit, and strategic acquisition of mining assets worldwide — an estimated $57 billion invested in copper, cobalt, nickel, lithium, and rare earth mines and processing facilities from 2000 to 2021.

    The CHIPS Act-funded investments will take years to produce operational output. Vulcan Elements’ 10,000-ton magnet facility hasn’t been built yet. MP Materials’ heavy rare earth separation capacity is under development. The Thacker Pass lithium project in Nevada — the largest lithium deposit in the U.S. — had its Department of Energy loan restructured in October 2025 to include debt service deferrals, which tells you the economics remain fragile. The Pentagon’s price floor mechanism for rare earths is an admission that the market alone won’t sustain domestic production against Chinese competitors who operate at lower cost, lower environmental standards, and with direct state subsidy.

    There’s also a geographic diversification play that acknowledges the U.S. can’t do everything domestically. MP Materials announced a joint venture with the Pentagon and Saudi Arabia’s Ma’aden to build a rare earth refinery in Saudi Arabia — expanding non-Chinese separation capacity outside U.S. borders but within allied supply chains. The Export-Import Bank’s Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative finances upstream projects in allied countries where U.S. manufacturers have signed offtake agreements. The strategy is “friend-shoring” — building mineral processing capacity in countries that won’t weaponize it against the U.S. — because building it all domestically would take longer than the threat allows.

    The honest assessment

    The U.S. went from zero critical mineral strategy to $4.5 billion in deployed capital in roughly 18 months. That’s fast by government standards. It’s not fast by supply chain standards. China’s rare earth monopoly wasn’t built in 18 months, and it won’t be unwound in 18 months. The investments are necessary. They are not sufficient. And the fundamental constraint — that opening a mine in the U.S. takes longer than a presidential term — means the strategy requires continuity across administrations, which is the one thing American mineral policy has never had.

    The CHIPS Act’s evolution from semiconductor legislation to critical mineral funding vehicle is the clearest illustration of a lesson the copper shortage, the helium crisis, and the gallium export controls all teach independently: the energy transition, the AI buildout, and the defense industrial base all depend on the same materials, sourced from the same places, processed through the same chokepoints. We cover the full critical minerals landscape — from neodymium magnet manufacturing to China’s processing monopoly to the CHIPS Act response — across our Rare Earth Elements course, where the question isn’t whether the U.S. has the money to build a domestic supply chain but whether it has the time.

  • China’s Rare Earth Monopoly: How One Country Cornered the Market on Modern Technology

    In April 2025, China imposed export licensing requirements on seven rare earth elements—samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium—plus all their derivative compounds, metals, and magnets. Export volumes dropped roughly 74 percent within a month. Carmakers in the United States and Europe couldn’t get permanent magnets. Some cut production. Some shut down factories temporarily. European rare earth prices hit six times the Chinese domestic price—a spread so wide it essentially constituted an export tax without calling itself one. The International Energy Agency described it as supply concentration risk “becoming reality.”

    Then in October, China escalated. Five more elements added to the control list. Export restrictions extended to lithium-ion battery supply chains, synthetic graphite anode materials, and superhard materials including synthetic diamond. And—this is the part that made trade lawyers lose sleep—China applied the foreign direct product rule to rare earths for the first time. That mechanism, which the U.S. had pioneered to restrict semiconductor exports to China, now worked in reverse: products made anywhere in the world using Chinese-origin rare earth materials or Chinese rare earth processing technology required an export license from Beijing. China wasn’t just controlling what left its borders. It was claiming jurisdiction over what happened to its materials after they left.

    The controls were partially suspended in November 2025 as part of a broader U.S.-China trade negotiation, buying roughly a year of breathing room. But the message was delivered. China had demonstrated that it could, at will, disrupt the supply chains for electric vehicles, wind turbines, fighter jets, guided missiles, smartphones, MRI machines, and essentially every piece of advanced technology that relies on permanent magnets—which is most of them. And it demonstrated this not through a theoretical exercise or a diplomatic warning but by actually doing it, watching the global manufacturing base scramble, and then offering to turn it back on as a negotiating concession.

    The question everyone should be asking is not “how did China get this leverage?” The question is “how did every other country let them?”

    The strategic bet nobody noticed

    The standard version of this story starts with Deng Xiaoping reportedly saying in 1992 that “the Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.” Whether he actually said it in those exact words is debated—the original context was a visit to Bayan Obo, the world’s largest rare earth mine, in Inner Mongolia—but the policy direction was unmistakable. China decided, decades before anyone else was paying attention, that rare earth processing would be a strategic industry worth dominating.

    The decision wasn’t about mining. Rare earth elements are not geologically rare—they’re found on every continent, including in the United States, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and throughout Africa and Scandinavia. The name is misleading. What’s rare is the willingness to process them, because rare earth processing is genuinely nasty. Separating individual rare earth elements from ore requires extensive chemical processing—solvent extraction, acid leaching, ion exchange—that produces large volumes of toxic and sometimes radioactive waste. The environmental costs are enormous. The margins, historically, have been thin. And the capital investment required to build a separation facility from scratch is measured in billions of dollars and years of construction.

    China accepted those costs. Starting in the 1980s and accelerating through the 1990s and 2000s, Chinese state-supported enterprises built out the entire value chain: mining, concentration, separation, oxide production, metal refining, alloy manufacturing, and finished magnet production. They did it with lower labor costs, lower environmental standards, and state subsidies that made it effectively impossible for competitors to operate profitably. Western rare earth operations—including the Mountain Pass mine in California, which had been the world’s largest rare earth producer—shut down because they couldn’t compete on price. By the early 2010s, China controlled over 95 percent of global rare earth production.

    The genius of the strategy—if that’s the right word for a policy that also created massive environmental sacrifice zones across Inner Mongolia—was that China didn’t just dominate one link in the chain. It dominated every link. Mining the ore is step one. Separating it into individual oxides is step two. Reducing the oxides to metals is step three. Alloying the metals and manufacturing finished magnets is step four. Each step requires specialized expertise, equipment, and chemical processes that take years to develop. China built all four steps while the rest of the world was content to buy the output. By the time anyone realized the dependency was strategic rather than merely commercial, the dependency was so deep that unwinding it would take a decade at minimum.

    The numbers in 2026

    The IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook reports that for 19 of 20 important strategic minerals, China is the leading refiner, with an average market share of 70 percent. For rare earths specifically, the concentration is even more extreme. China processes approximately 90 percent of the world’s rare earth oxides. It manufactures roughly 85 percent of global NdFeB permanent magnets. It controls a near-monopoly—95 percent or above—in precursor cathode materials and lithium iron phosphate cathode materials for batteries.

    The European Central Bank estimated that over 80 percent of large European firms are no more than three intermediaries away from a Chinese rare earth producer. That’s not a supply chain. That’s a dependency relationship with a single counterparty who has demonstrated both the capability and the willingness to restrict supply for geopolitical purposes.

    The U.S. position is marginally better but not fundamentally different. MP Materials operates the Mountain Pass mine in California—the only active rare earth mining operation of scale in the country—and in 2024 produced a record 45,000 metric tons of rare earth oxide concentrate. Its Independence facility in Fort Worth, Texas, began trial production of sintered NdFeB magnets in late 2025, with a target capacity of about 1,000 metric tons per year. Global NdFeB magnet production is roughly 220,000 to 240,000 metric tons annually. MP Materials’ output, at full capacity, would represent less than half a percent of global supply. The Pentagon awarded a conditional $620 million loan to Vulcan Elements and ReElement Technologies to scale domestic magnet production. Noveon Magnetics is currently the only active rare earth magnet manufacturer in the United States and announced a partnership with Australian producer Lynas Rare Earths to build a domestic supply chain. All of these efforts are real and necessary and collectively amount to a rounding error relative to China’s installed capacity.

    Why you can’t just “build more mines”

    The most common response to the rare earth supply chain problem—from politicians, editorial writers, and people who haven’t spent time understanding the chemistry—is some version of “we have rare earths too, we should just mine them.” The problem is that mining is the easy part. It’s the processing that creates the monopoly, and processing is where China’s advantage is nearly insurmountable in the short term.

    Separating rare earth elements from each other is one of the most chemically demanding industrial processes in existence. The 17 rare earth elements have nearly identical chemical properties—that’s why they’re grouped together—which means separating, say, neodymium from praseodymium from dysprosium from terbium requires hundreds of stages of solvent extraction, each stage achieving only a marginal enrichment. The process consumes enormous volumes of hydrochloric acid, sodium hydroxide, and organic solvents, and produces proportional volumes of chemical waste. Building a separation plant from scratch takes three to five years and costs over a billion dollars. Qualifying the output to meet the specifications required by magnet manufacturers—purity levels of 99.5 percent or higher for individual oxides—adds additional time and expertise.

    China has spent forty years optimizing these processes. The rest of the world is starting from approximately zero, and the engineers and chemists who know how to run a rare earth separation plant at commercial scale are overwhelmingly in China. You can build the facility. Staffing it with people who know what they’re doing is a different problem.

    The 2010 precedent nobody learned from

    This isn’t even the first time China used rare earth export controls as geopolitical leverage. In 2010, following a territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China informally restricted rare earth exports to Japan—the world’s largest rare earth consumer at the time and a major manufacturer of permanent magnets and electronics. The embargo was never officially acknowledged but was widely reported by Japanese importers and confirmed by market data showing a sudden, dramatic drop in shipments.

    The global response was alarm, hand-wringing, and a burst of investment in alternative supply chains that faded as soon as prices normalized. The U.S. opened the Mountain Pass mine back up. Australia’s Lynas Rare Earths built a processing facility in Malaysia. The WTO ruled against China’s export quotas in 2014. China lifted the quotas. Prices came down. And the structural dependency went essentially unchanged because the alternative projects were more expensive than Chinese supply and couldn’t compete once the price pressure was removed.

    Fifteen years later, the same vulnerability was exploited with the same playbook, except this time the controls were more comprehensive, the extraterritorial provisions were new, and the geopolitical context—a genuine strategic competition between the U.S. and China rather than a bilateral territorial dispute—suggests the restrictions will recur regardless of any temporary suspension.

    What the response actually looks like

    The EU passed the Critical Raw Materials Act and launched the RESourceEU initiative for joint purchasing and stockpiling. The European Parliament called China’s actions “coercive” and demanded acceleration of domestic mining projects and bilateral partnerships with alternative supplier nations. Germany committed to €35 billion in resilience and deterrence programs that include rare earth supply chain diversification.

    The U.S. is pursuing a multi-track strategy: domestic mining and processing (MP Materials, Vulcan Elements), allied supply chains (Lynas partnership with Noveon), tariffs on Chinese magnets (25 percent, scheduled for 2026), and stockpiling. The Pentagon’s Defense Logistics Agency maintains a strategic reserve of certain rare earth materials, though the size and adequacy of the reserve are classified.

    But here’s the honest assessment: none of these efforts will meaningfully reduce China’s leverage within the next five years. The processing infrastructure takes years to build, the workforce takes years to train, the qualification cycles for defense-grade materials take years to complete, and the volumes required to replace Chinese supply are orders of magnitude beyond what any current Western facility can produce. The 2025 export controls demonstrated that China can inflict significant economic damage on the global manufacturing base essentially at will—and that the threat of doing so is itself a powerful bargaining chip that costs Beijing nothing to maintain.

    The rare earth monopoly is not a market failure. It’s a strategic outcome, achieved through decades of deliberate industrial policy, tolerated by decades of Western indifference, and now leveraged with a precision that makes it one of the most effective instruments of economic statecraft in the 21st century. The question of how to respond is real and urgent. The question of whether a response is possible in time to matter during the current geopolitical cycle is considerably less certain.

    We cover China’s rare earth strategy—along with the science, processing chemistry, and geopolitics of 36 critical elements from lithium to uranium—across our Rare Earth Elements & Critical Minerals course. If the foreign direct product rule applied to magnets changed your understanding of how supply chain warfare works, the course goes element by element through every chokepoint.